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We provide microeconomic evidence on the link between ethnic frictions and
market efficiency, using dyadic data on managers and borrowers from a large Indian
bank. Our analysis builds on the idea that exposure to religion-based communal
violence may intensify branch managers’ same-group preferences, and thus result
in lending decisions that are more sensitive to a borrower’s religion. We find that,
in our sample of Hindu loan officers, those with substantial riot exposure prior to
joining the bank lend relatively less to Muslim borrowers. Riot-exposed officers’
loans to Muslims are also less likely to default, suggesting that the lower lending
rate for Muslims is driven by taste-based discrimination. This bias is persistent
across a bank officer’s tenure, suggesting that the economic costs of ethnic conflict
are long-lasting, potentially spanning across generations.
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I Introduction
At a macro level, inter-group frictions are associated with poor economic outcomes.
Easterly and Levine (1997) in particular estimate that ethnic divisions, created by ar-
bitrarily drawn colonial borders, can account for a third of Africa’s economic under-
performance. The empirical literature on the microeconomic foundations that underly
this macro relationship between ethnic divisions and various social and economic out-
comes is less well-developed. What determines the depths of a country’s ethnic fissures?
Beyond outright ethnic violence, how might these fissures impact economic progress?
And to what extent are ethnic tensions malleable across — or indeed even within — a
single generation?
In this paper, we provide microeconomic evidence on the link between ethnic frictions
and market efficiency, in a setting that allows us to examine the extent to which these
frictions can worsen in the course of a single generation. Specifically, we analyze the
lending decisions of approximately 1800 loan officers at a large India bank, during 1999
– 2006. Using a database of Hindu-Muslim riots in India during the years 1950-1995
(compiled by Varshney (2006)), combined with data on each loan officer’s year and city
of birth, we may infer whether a loan officer’s hometown experienced ethnic riots before
he joined the bank. Bank records also require both loan officer and borrower to list their
religion, allowing us to determine whether a given pair share the same religion. Finally,
because of frequent officer rotation, we may infer the role of past experience of religious
conflict on current lending decisions based on the turnover of “riot-exposed” Hindu branch
managers (we focus on Hindu managers because of the extreme paucity of other religions
among bank employees at this rank). Finally, since we observe whether each loan goes
into default, we have a credible measure of the efficiency consequences of preferential in-
group lending that allows us to distinguish between statistical discrimination, prejudice,
and information frictions as the underlying mechanism.
In our main results, which use local riot deaths of greater than or equal to 10 as the
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definition of riot exposure, we find that the presence of a riot-exposed branch manager
is associated with 4 percentage points higher lending to Hindu borrowers relative to all
other borrowers. Qualitatively, this pattern is similar if we use less stringent cutoffs of 1
or 5 deaths to define riot exposure, a more stringent cutoff of exposure to at least one riot
with 10 or more deaths, or use log(1+Deaths) as a continuous measure of riot intensity.1
The decline in lending to Muslims by riot-experienced managers could be due to
taste-based discrimination (in-group favoritism) or statistical discrimination if riot-exposed
managers are less capable of assessing the creditworthiness of out-group loan applicants.
The former explanation would imply a lower quality of loans made to same-group bor-
rowers, while the latter explanation implies that in-group favoritism should diminish for
borrowers whose creditworthiness is already known (Altonji et al., 2001). We find that
the presence of a riot-exposed branch manager is associated with a 2.5 percentage point
increase in defaults by Hindu relative to Muslim borrowers, consistent with in-group fa-
voritism as the dominant explanation for the branch-level shift in loan composition across
religions. We also find that riot-experienced managers lend less to first time as well as
to repeat Muslim borrowers who have an established relationship with the branch, which
suggests little impact from riot exposure on statistical discrimination.2
We may, to a large extent, rule out alternative explanations for the patterns we
observe by exploiting the granularity of our data. District × Quarter fixed effects enable
us to control for local demand shocks, and Branch fixed effects further allow us to control
for idiosyncratic (though time-invariant) differences in credit demand or supply for a
1We also use exposure to the 1969 Gujarat riots – by far the biggest instance of post-partition Hindu-
Muslim violence during 1950-1995 – as our “treatment” variable, and similarly find a reduction in lending
by loan officers exposed to this event.
2There are two primary explanations for the effect of riot exposure on in-group favoritism — an
increase in in-group affinity, or intensified out-group animus. While our data do not allow us to adjudicate
decisively between these two cases, we may provide some suggestive evidence by comparing the effect of a
riot-exposed branch manager’s arrival on Muslims borrowers versus other non-Hindus. Given that India
only experienced Hindu-Muslim riots during the period we consider, an animosity-based explanation
predicts that Hindu managers will reduce loan disbursements to Muslims borrowers specifically, whereas
increased in-group affinity would imply a relative decline in lending to all non-Hindu borrowers (relative
to Hindu borrowers). We observe that lending to non-Hindus is invariant to a branch manager’s riot
exposure, suggesting that out-group animus (rather than stronger in-group identification) is responsible
for our main results.
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particular group in a given branch. Finally, Home District × Quarter fixed effects ensure
that we can distinguish the riot-exposure effect from a broader in-group bias among
branch managers from areas that have experienced relatively frequent riots.3
Our main results provide evidence that differences in out-group animus based solely
on childhood exposure to religious conflict leads to significant inefficiencies in loan al-
location. Furthermore, our source of identification — local riots during loan officers’
childhood years — indicates that in-group favoritism can intensify even within a single
generation.
We next explore several dimensions of heterogeneity in our data, with the objective
of further probing the robustness of our results, as well as evaluating the causal path-
ways underlying the lower rate of Muslim lending by riot-exposed officers. We begin by
examining the impact of riot exposure on lending decisions as a function of when the
loan officer was first exposed to Hindu-Muslim violence, grouping loan officers based on
whether exposure first occurred before the age of 10, between 10 and 18, or older than
18. Consistent with research in developmental psychology (Raabe and Beelmann, 2011),
which finds that prejudice develops relatively early in childhood, we find that exposure
prior to age 10 is the most important determinant of later lending decisions.
We also explore whether the effect of riot exposure depends on characteristics of a
branch manager’s posting, in particular whether the branch has a local monopoly, and
whether it is in an urban or rural area. We find that the effect of riot exposure is invariant
to the branch’s circumstances in both cases. The similar impact of riot-exposure in
monopoly versus competitive branches mitigates the concern that we are overestimating
the overall impact of riot exposure on Muslims due to switching by borrowers facing
discrimination. The similar effect of riot exposure for urban versus rural areas indicates
that our results are stable across very different social and economic circumstances.
In our final analysis we turn to a contemporaneous shock to loan officers’ preferences
3Given that we perform most of our analysis using shares of lending to each religion, we effectively ac-
count for Branch × Quarter shifts in overall lending, and also (time-invariant) religion-specific differences
across branches.
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resulting from the 2002 Gujarat riots that resulted in over 2000 fatalities. We find that,
following these riots, lending to Muslims declines by 8 percentage points with the arrival of
a branch manager who was stationed in Gujarat at the time of the riots. For bank officers
stationed outside of Gujarat during the riots, we find that subsequent lending to Muslims
is correlated with state-level media coverage, as captured by newspaper circulation and
television viewership (although these results are not statistically significant across all
specifications). The first set of findings provides some validation for Hindu-Muslim riots
as a credible source of variation in Hindu-Muslim animosity, and extends our results to
show that such shocks – if sufficiently severe – can impact preferences even if they occur
during adulthood, a finding which echoes those of Hjort (2014) and Shayo and Zussman
(2017). The findings on the role of newspaper and television penetration on subsequent
lending emphasize the role of the media in aggravating intergroup frictions, consistent
with the findings of Yanagizawa-Drott (2014) and DellaVigna et al. (2014).
Our research contributes most directly to the emerging microeconomic literature on
the causes of in-group preferences and the consequences for economic transactions. The
current paper builds on the data and insights of Fisman et al. (2017), which shows that
loan quantity and quality is improved by a religion/caste match between branch manager
and borrower. While the previous study emphasizes the two potentially counteracting
effects of cultural proximity — increased favoritism versus reduced information frictions
— our current work focuses on the changes in favoritism that may be induced by events
that intensify inter-group frictions.
Our paper joins a small set of papers that document the microeconomic consequences
of inter-group frictions on economic transactions. Most notably, Hjort (2014) studies the
consequences of ethnic divisions for team production in flower packaging firms and, like
us, uses ethnic riots to identify the impact of inter-group frictions. Beyond the distinct
settings — India versus Kenya; credit markets versus team productivity — because of
India’s religious diversity we are able to draw a sharper distinction between increased
in-group amity versus intensified out-group animus. Furthermore, in contrast to Hjort
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(2014) as well as, to our knowledge, all prior research on the topic, we document the
lifelong consequences of racially divisive personal experiences in childhood, rather than
shorter-term increases in in-group favoritism as a result of current events. In this sense,
our work is also distinct from Shayo and Zussman (2011), who document an in-group bias
by Israeli judges as a result of nearby terrorist attacks in the preceding year (Shayo and
Zussman (2017) shows that the effects persist even after violence subsides a few years
later). Such work – ours included – aims in turn to link qualitative accounts and the
theoretical literature on ethnic conflict and economic development (e.g., (Horowitz (1985)
and Esteban and Ray (2008)) to empirical evidence, while also providing a foundation
for the more macro-level research on ethnic divisions and economic outcomes (e.g., Guiso
et al. (2009), Easterly and Levine (1997), and Alesina and Ferrara (2005).
Finally, our work contributes to the literature on the long-lasting impacts of personal
experience on individual decision making. Prior work has largely focused on how early life
experiences impact financial decisions (see, for example, Malmendier and Nagel (2011) on
exposure to the Depression and savings, and Bernile et al. (2016) on CEOS’ exposure to
early life disaster and corporate risk-taking). We similarly document long-lasting effects
from early life experiences in the distinct domain of in-group preferences.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. In the next section, we provide an overview
of the dyadic data on bank managers and borrowers as well as the data on communal
conflicts. Section III lays out our baseline empirical specification and presents our results.
Section IV concludes.
II Data
We use two primary data sources — individual loan portfolio and personnel records
of a large public sector bank, and data on Hindu-Muslim violence from Varshney (2006).
The bank loan data provide information at the branch-borrower dyad level, which may in
turn be matched to data on the branch manager at the time the loan is issued. Critically,
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both manager and borrower data include information on religion. Our bank data begin
with the second quarter of 1999 and end with the first quarter of 2006, while the Hindu-
Muslim riot data includes all riots involving the two religions for the years 1950-1995.
II.A Bank Loan Data
Our bank dataset includes loan-level data (including interest rate, collateral, and
repayment status) for every borrower, in each quarter that the borrower has a loan
outstanding. To ensure a match between the loan officer’s riot exposure and lending
practices in a branch, we focus on branches in which the branch manager interacts more
directly with borrowers (in the bank’s classification, levels 1 – 3 branches). This omits
larger branches for which interaction between the branch head and individual borrowers
is limited, and for which the loan portfolio is more heavily skewed toward corporate loans
(see Skrastins and Vig (2015)).
Since our focus is on the group-level match between a branch manager and borrowers,
we aggregate the lending data for all borrowers in the same religious group in a given
branch at the quarterly level, which is the frequency of reporting of loan information
(i.e., we aggregate to the branch-group-quarter level). We include Hindus and Muslims
as distinct religious groups, and combine all other religions (Christians, Sihks, Parsis,
Buddhists, and others) into a single “Other” category. Because we analyze how bank
manager turnover induces changes in lending practices, our main outcome variables focus
on lending flows, in particular new debt issued, number of new loans, and the repayment
rates of these new loans. In a small number of branches (1.4 percent of the total sample)
Hindu borrowers account for all loans outstanding throughout our entire sample period.
We omit these branches from our analysis since they are generally in locations in which
there is no non-Hindu borrower demand to identify officer lending supply effects; in
practice the inclusion/exclusion of these branches makes little difference to our point
estimates.
We use the bank’s quarterly personnel records to identify the head of each branch.
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For every branch there is a single manager who is responsible for the approval and dis-
bursement of loans.4 Though branch heads have control over loan and collateral amount,
they have no discretion over interest rates, which are set based on the type of loan.
In addition to information on the loan officer’s religion, the personnel records also
provide data on the hometown, year of birth and the year the officer joined the bank for
approximately 75% of the loan officers in the sample. We use this information to link
each officer with a measure of riot exposure, which we calculate based on the number of
Hindu-Muslim riots that took place while the manager resided in his hometown, which
we assume to be the period from the manager’s birthdate until the year he joins the
bank. Since the bank forbids any loan officer from working in his hometown, loan officers
necessarily leave their birthplace at that point in time.
We emphasize that after joining the bank, loan officers experience frequent rotation
among branches, which will help us to identify the effect of riot exposure on managers’
lending decisions.
Finally, we observe that, despite having fixed salaries (i.e., pay that is invariant to
performance), officers in Indian state banks such as the one we study do have incentive to
perform well. Rewards come via promotion to higher grades (with higher compensation)
or better postings: loan officers may be sent to locales with more or better perquisites,
such as higher pay (overseas), larger houses, the use of a car, or control over a larger
portfolio (large branches). In a similar vein, poor performers might be moved to less
desirable places, which have a weak infrastructure and poor schools. Hence there exist
incentives to issue profitable loans and perform well along other qualitative dimensions
that serve as inputs into their evaluations (though these incentives in state-owned banks
may be relatively weak compared to private banks).5 Thus, to the extent that we observe
favoritism in lending that worsens an officer’s repayment rates, we may say that he faces
4If the branch is small, a lower-ranking officer is in charge of the branch, and requires approval of
a more senior officer to make a lending decision. However, even in these cases the decision to send the
application to the senior officer at a central branch rests with the local branch manager.
5Beyond pay-for-performance, officers at state-owned banks have greater job security, as they can be
fired only under exceptional circumstances.
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a cost to obtain the utility benefits from prejudice.
II.B Conflict Data
Our conflict data come from Varshney (2006). These data have been used extensively
by researchers studying the causes or consequences of conflicts in India (Mitra and Ray
(2014), Sarsons (2015), Jha (2014) among others). The dataset is based on news reports
from The Times of India, one of India’s leading newspapers, which is used to collect
reports of instances of communal violence in India during 1950-1995. For each report of
Hindu-Muslim riots, the dataset provides information on the number of deaths, injuries,
and arrests, as well as the timing of the riot and city/town/village where it occurred.6 As
Varshney emphasizes, the city (rather than a higher level of aggregation such as state) is
the“the most logical and significant level of analysis,” because of the substantial within-
state variation in the extent of riots (Varshney (2006). Our measure of riot exposure is
thus also constructed at the city-level: for each loan officer, riot exposure is based on the
number of riot deaths in his city of birth, during the period spanning his birthdate to
the date he joined the bank. Larger cities have more riot deaths, conditional on a riot
occurring (though this correlation is surprisingly modest — the officer-level correlation
between log(population) and riot exposure is 0.22), so we will control for (the log of)
hometown population in some of our specifications below.
Because our riot data are for the years 1950-1995, we limit our sample to loan officers
who were born on or after 1950, and who joined the bank no later than 1995. Throughout,
our main definition of “riot-exposed” (Riot) is an indicator variable denoting whether a
loan officer was exposed to 10 or more riot deaths while resident in his hometown. While
this is an arbitrary cutoff, we wish to avoid describing an officer as riot-exposed if the
events that took place during his youth were modest in scale. We also present our main
results with log(1 + RiotDeaths) as a riot exposure measure; additionally, we present
6The dataset does not, however, indicate the religion of the casualties and arrests. Finally, the data
also provide a possible cause of each riot, but in most cases this is the subjective assessment of the
authors.
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results in which we relax the cutoff to 1 or 5 riot deaths, and also results in which we
strengthen the riot exposure criterion to include only loan officers exposed to a single riot
with ten or more deaths.
In Table 3, we present summary statistics for the main variables we employ in our
analysis, with all observations presented at the branch-group-quarter level that we employ
in our analysis. We observe that only 14.4 percent of observations have loan officers
with RiotDeaths > 0. 11.9 and 9.6 percent of loan officers have RiotDeaths ≥ 5 and
RiotDeaths ≥ 10. In Figure 1 we show the distribution of riot death exposure at the
level of the individual loan officer, for the 256 officers with non-zero riot deaths. We
censor the distribution at 50 deaths (around the 87th percentile) for ease of exposition,
since a small fraction of officers are exposed to very high riot deaths (e.g., 9.8 percent of
the officers in Figure 1 are exposed to more than 100 deaths, and 7.9 percent exposed
to more than 400 deaths). The patterns indicate that a sizeable number of officers are
exposed to a very small number of riot deaths: 21 officers (7.9 percent) were exposed to
just a single riot death, while 9 officers (3.4 percent) were exposed to two deaths.
II.C Additional City- and State-Level Data
While most potential controls are absorbed by our various fixed effects, we utilize
several state- and city-level attributes as controls and in exploring the heterogeneous
effects of riot exposure. We obtain city and town population data from the 2011 national
census, conducted by the Census Organization of India. We also employ two measures of
media exposure in examining how the 2002 Gujarat riots affected loan officers stationed
across India. Our first measure is based on survey responses from the National Family
Health Survey (1998-99). We define TV Share as the fraction of respondents who report
watching television at least once a week, which is provided for each state disaggregated by
community size (rural, semiurban, urban, and metropolitan). As an alternative measure
of media penetration, we use newspaper circulation per capita at the state level, from
the Registrar of Newspapers for India maintained by the Ministry of Information and
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Broadcasting, available via India’s open government data platform.
III Results
Our empirical strategy hinges on the variation in exposure to communal conflicts by
a manager early in life coupled with the policy of exogenous rotation of managers across
bank branches. The baseline empirical specification identifies the effect of riot-exposure
through the time series variation in loan outcomes for a particular religion in a particular
branch following the rotation of managers with different exposures to communal conflict.
More specifically, our baseline empirical specification takes the following form:
ReligSharebq = βRiotExperiencem(bq) + Controlsbq + αb + γd(b),q + υh(bq),q + εbq(1)
ReligSharebq is the fraction of new lending obtained by a religion (Muslim, Hindu, or
Others) at branch b in quarter q; RiotExperiencem(bq) is an indicator variable denoting
whether branch manager m stationed at branch b in quarter q was riot-exposed; αb is a
set of branch fixed effects; γd(b),q is a set of district × quarter fixed effects; and υh(bq),q is a
set of home district × quarter fixed effects for each home district of our set of managers.
The branch fixed effects capture time-invariant characteristics of each branch, which
ensures that the estimation of β comes from time series variation induced from rotation
of branch managers. Since we run the above regression separately for each religion (Hindu,
Muslim, and Other), district × quarter fixed effects control for any shocks and trends in
the demand for credit of a particular religion in a district.
We express our primary dependent variable in loan shares because it lends itself to
a straightforward interpretation of the overall effect of riot exposure on lending, cap-
turing substitution between religions as well as expansion or contraction for particular
religions (holding lending to other religions constant). We will also present results using
log(1 + AmountBorrowed) as the outcome variable, for each religion (Hindu, Muslim,
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and Other). This will allow us to explore whether the shift in the composition of lend-
ing is from expanded borrowing by the favored group, contracted borrowing from the
disfavored group, or both.
III.A Impact of Riot Experience on Loan Quantity
We begin by showing the results of specification 1 in Table 4. Recall that our main
definition of riot exposure uses Deaths ≥ 10 as the threshold, but we will also present
results that use cutoffs of 1 and 5 deaths, as well as a riot intensity measure based
on the natural logarithm of (one plus) the number of deaths in hometown riots. In
the first three columns, we present the results for Muslim, Hindu, and other borrowers
respectively. The negative coefficient on Muslim lending, combined with the positive
coefficient on Hindu lending of near-identical magnitude, imply that the presence of a
riot-experienced loan officer is associated with an offsetting reallocation of lending from
Muslim to Hindu borrowers. It is near-mechanical that we then observe only a small
effect on other borrowers in column (3). The magnitude of this reallocation is very large
when compared with the base rate of new lending to Muslims, which is 6.2 percent for
our sample of bank-quarter observations in which a non-riot officer is the branch head.
In the second set of columns, we present results for the number of new loan contracts
(rather than new loan amounts); the patterns are qualitatively very similar.
We next show an “event study” to illustrate how the average effect of riot exposure
varies around branch manager transitions. If riot exposure has a causal affect on lend-
ing across religions, we expect a discrete increase in the fraction of lending to Hindus
(Muslims) that coincides with the presence of a riot-exposed manager.
To examine the timing of the change in lending around the arrival of a riot-exposed
branch manager, we estimate the following specification separately for Muslim and Hindu
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αb + γd(b),q + υh(bq),q + εbq (2)
where ReligShare is a religion’s share (either Hindu or Muslim) of total borrowing at
branch b in quarter q, and RiotExperienceim(b) is an indicator variable denoting time i
relative to the arrival of a riot-exposed manager at branch b. Thus, RiotExperience−3m(b)
is equal to one if, in three periods, a riot-experienced manager arrives at the branch. We
define this variable for i = −3,−2,−1, 0, 1; finally, we define RiotExperience2+m(b) to be
one for all quarters for which a riot-experienced manager has been present for at least
two periods, and no transition will occur for at least two quarters (to avoid overlap with
the other variables).
In the top panel of Figure (2), we plot the coefficient estimates from specification
2, for both Muslim and Hindu borrowers. Consistent with riot exposure having a causal
effect on lending patterns, we find that the increase in Hindu borrowers’ share of lending
increases discretely with the riot-exposed manager’s arrival; we observe an offsetting
decline in the Muslim share (the residual is lending to other religions, which is a relatively
small fraction of overall lending). We observe similar patterns in the bottom panel, in
which the dependent variable is the share of the number of loans (rather than total value
of loans) disbursed.
We next show the results of specifications that use log(1 + AmountBorrowed) as
the outcome variable, rather than share of borrowing. As noted above, this allows us to
examine whether the shift in borrowing composition under riot-exposed branch managers
takes place through expansion of lending to Hindus, reduced lending to Muslims, or
both. The results, shown in Table 5, indicate that the shift in lending composition
comes primarily from a reduction in Muslim borrowing rather than an increase in Hindu
borrowing. For Muslim borrowing, the coefficient on riot exposure is negative, whether
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measured by borrowing amount or number of borrowers, and is at least several times
larger than the comparable coefficient for Hindu borrowing, which is also of inconsistent
sign across the specifications based on loan amounts (column (2)) versus number of loan
contracts (column (5)).
We present a series of appendix tables which show the robustness of our main results
to alternative definitions of riot exposure, as well as additional controls. In Appendix
Tables A.1 – A.3, we show the patterns for alternative definitions of RiotExperience,
based on cutoffs of 5 and 1 deaths (Tables A.1 and A.2), as well as a continuous mea-
sure using log(1 + Deaths) (Table A.3). For both the cutoff of 5 deaths as well as the
continuous measure, we observe results that are similar to those we present in Table 4
(albeit marginally weaker for a cutoff of 5). For a cutoff of 1 death, we find our results are
considerably attenuated – while the Muslim coefficient is still significant at the 5 percent
level in Column (1), it is half the size of the comparable coefficient in our main results,
and the Hindu coefficient, while positive, no longer approaches significance. We interpret
this as resulting from the noise added by assigned RiotExperience = 1 for cities with
relatively little religion-related rioting that may have been insufficient to have a lasting
influence on local Hindu-Muslim relations or perceptions. In Appendix Table A.4 we use
the most significant riot even during our sample period, the Gujarat riots of 1969, to
define riot exposure (i.e., a loan officer is defined as riot exposed only if his hometown
was affected by the 1969 Gujarat riots, and the officer was present in his hometown when
the riots occurred). We again find a negative and significant relationship between a loan
officer’s riot exposure and Muslims’ share of borrowing. Finally, we show that our main
results are unaffected by controlling for hometown population — while we have no ex
ante expectation that Hindu or Muslim borrowing shares would be affected by city size,
we investigate the robustness of our results to its inclusion, given the correlation between
city size and riot deaths. We show results controlling for log(CityPopulation) in Ap-
pendix Table A.5; none of the coefficients of interest are affected, and in no case does the
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coefficient on city population approach significance.7
Finally, we examine whether riot exposure results in discrimination among Hindus
based on caste affiliation. These results may be seen as a placebo test of the effects of riot
exposure, since we have no ex ante expectation that Hindu-Muslim conflict would spill
over to affect credit access based on caste. (Increased in-group preferences could in theory
lead to increased caste-based discrimination. However, given the lack of any effect of riot
exposure on “other religion” borrowers, this would be surprising.) We divide borrowers
into four groups based on whether they are identified as General Caste, Scheduled Caste,
or Scheduled Tribe, and look at borrowing at the branch × caste group × quarter level.
We define an indicator variable, SameCasteBorrowersm(bq), c, to be equal to one if the
branch manager at branch b in quarter q is of caste c, and zero otherwise.8
In Table 6, we show our results on caste-based differences in lending. Consistent
with Fisman et al. (2017), we find a positive and significant effect of shared caste on
lending. However, the coefficient on the interaction with riot exposure is close to zero
(though imprecisely estimated), emphasizing that the link from Hindu-Muslim violence
to lending is specific to religious differences rather than other social divisions.
III.B Impact of Riot Experience on Loan Quality
As highlighted in section I, if the decline in Muslim lending associated with riot-
experienced managers is the result of animus-based discrimination, we would expect bet-
ter repayment rates for loans issued by riot-exposed officers to Muslim borrowers. We
emphasize that, if this is the case, there is a real cost to the loan officer from doing so:
since promotion and posting assignments – and the resultant increases in pay grade and
perquisites – depend on loan performance, a loan officer sacrifices benefits in order to
derive the utility gained by acting on his prejudices.
7We have similarly examined whether our results are robust to dropping managers from very small
communities, or controlling more flexibly for city size by using population decile dummies. We find that
the estimated coefficient on riot exposure is largely unchanged in these alternative specifications.
8See Fisman et al. (2017) for details on the loan officer and borrower caste data.
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We explore the effects of riot exposure on repayment in Table 7. In our first pair
of regressions we include branch × religion (αbr), home district × quarter (υh(bq),q), and
district × religion × quarter (γd(b),qr) fixed effects, as well as the same branch-quarter
controls we employ in Table 4:
Defaultbqr = β1RiotExperiencem(bq) + β2RiotExperiencem(bq) ×NonMuslimbqr
+αbr + υh(bq),q + γd(b),qr + εgbq (3)
Defaultbqr is the fraction of loans issued to borrowers of religion r in branch-quarter bq
that are more than 90 days past due within a year of issuance, and NonMuslim denotes
both Hindu and “other” religious groups. We present the results of this regression in col-
umn (1). The direct effect of RiotExperience, which captures the effect of riot experience
on defaults by Muslim borrowers, is -0.035 (significant at the 10 percent level), indicating
that loans issued to Muslim borrowers by riot-exposed loan officers have a default rate
that is 3.5 percentage points lower than those issued by non-riot loan officers. As a bench-
mark, the default rate among non-riot loan officers to Muslim borrowers in the sample
of branches with non-zero Muslim default is 6.3 percent, indicating that riot exposure
leads to a 50 percent decline in Muslim default. The coefficient on the interaction term,
β2, is 0.025 (significant at the 5 percent level), indicating that the lower default rate for
riot-experienced loan officers manifests itself primarily for lending to Muslims, consis-
tent with Muslim borrowers (and only Muslim borrowers) facing a higher credit standard
from riot-experienced officers. In column (2) we disaggregate non-Muslim borrowers into
Hindu versus others. Since a relatively small fraction of loans go to borrowers in the
“other” category (4.5 percent of total lending)the coefficient on OtherBorrowers is nois-
ily estimated, though near-identical in magnitude to the coefficient on HinduBorrowing,
further reinforcing the view that the relative decline in default rate for Muslim borrow-
ers is a result of higher standards for Muslims rather than a slackening of standards for
‘in-group’ Hindu borrowers.
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We present more stringent variants on specification 4 in columns (3) and (4), which
also include Branch × Quarter fixed effects. In these saturated specifications, we can
no longer identify the direct effect of RiotExperience, which varies only at the branch-
quarter level, though we can still identify the differential effect of riot exposure on differ-
ent groups via RiotExperience interactions. While the coefficient on RiotExperience×
NonMuslimBorrowers in column (3) is marginally smaller than its counterpart in col-
umn (1) (0.18 versus 0.25), and significant only at the 10 percent level, the two sets of
results are broadly consistent with a tightening of lending standards to Muslims under
riot-experienced branch managers. The results in column (4), which disaggregate non-
Muslim borrowing into Hindu versus Other borrowing, indicate a larger impact on Hindu
borrowing, though the coefficients are imprecisely estimated.
III.C Learning about borrowers and loan officer experience
There are several channels through which lender experience could attenuate the ef-
fects of riot exposure if they resulted from excessively negative prior beliefs about Muslim
creditworthiness. First, a given loan officer may learn over the course of his tenure at
the bank: given the relatively high repayment rates for Muslim borrowers on loans issued
by riot-experienced managers, one would expect that the effect of riot experience would
dissipate with experience if the bias against Muslim borrowers were based on statisti-
cal discrimination. Second, additional information on a Muslim borrower – in particular
whether he or she has repaid loans in the past – should mitigate a riot-exposed manager’s
negative priors on the borrower’s creditworthiness.
To explore the first of these possibilities, we augment equation 4 to included the
interaction of riot exposure and an indicator variable denoting whether a loan officer’s
years with the bank is above the sample median of 24 years. We present these results in
Table 8. If loan officers learn that their beliefs of Muslims’ creditworthiness are excessively
negative, we expect the interaction term to be positive in column (1) (and negative in
column (2)). We find instead that the point estimate is negative, though it does not
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approach significance. (If we instead measure experience via the logarithm of years with
the bank, we generate qualitatively identical results.) In Appendix Table A.6, we consider
a separate margin of exposure and learning – the time that a loan officer has spent in a
particular branch. We do so by defining an indicator variable denoting observations for
which the loan officer has been at a branch for 4 or more quarters (the sample median). We
find that the interaction of (branch-specific) experience and riot experience is very close to
zero, again suggesting that our main findings do not result from statistical discrimination
against Muslims.
We next turn to the potential effect of providing the loan officer with hard informa-
tion on borrowers’ creditworthiness by splitting our sample into lending to new versus
repeat borrowers. In Table 9 and 10, we show the estimation of equation 4 for the two
types of borrowers separately. The coefficients are quite similar for both groups.
Overall, our results in this section suggest that the negative effect of riot exposure on
Muslim lending is not driven by different beliefs in Muslim borrowers’ creditworthiness,
since the effect does not dissipate with lender experience, nor with more precise infor-
mation on borrower quality. Rather, the results we document in the earlier part of the
paper appear to be driven by animosity toward Muslim borrowers by Hindu loan officers.
III.D Geographic heterogeneity in the impact of riot exposure
In this section we examine the heterogeneity of the effect of riot exposure as a function
of a branch’s location along a pair of dimensions: urban versus rural, and branches for
which no other bank branch is located within a 10 kilometer radius (what we refer to below
as “monopoly” branches) versus those where prospective borrowers can choose among two
or more banking options (“competitive” branches). While these branch characteristics
are correlated (ρ = 0.737), they also reflect distinct concerns.
In looking at the urban versus rural split, we aim to explore whether the patterns
we describe in our main results hold broadly across very different socioeconomic settings.
To compare behavior in rural versus urban branches, we augment specification 4 with
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the interaction of RiotExperience and a branch-level indicator variable, Urban, which
captures whether the branch is in an urban (semiurban, urban, or metropolitan) area. We
report these results in Table 11, where we observe that the coefficient on the interaction
term is consistently small in magnitude and never approaches statistical significance,
indicating a similar impact of riot experience on loan officer behavior in rural and urban
branches.
We next turn to a comparison of riot experience on lending in monopoly versus
competitive branches. We do so to address a pair of concerns that result from borrower
switching across branches. Switching across branches within the bank could lead to
double-counting as a result of, for example, a Muslim borrower switching from a branch
where there has been a transition to a riot-experienced manager to a nearby branch there
has been no such transition. Borrowers switching to other banks as a result of a riot-
experienced manager’s arrival, while it would not bias our regression estimates, would
lead to an over-estimation of the broader economic consequences that result from in-
group favoritism by riot-experienced managers. If these were substantial concerns for our
analysis, we would expect to see a more muted impact in monopoly branches. In Table
12 we augment specification 4 with the interaction of RiotExperience and Monopoly, an
indicator variable which denotes monopoly branches. Again we find that the direct effect
of RiotExperience is significant (at least at the 5 percent level) in predicting lending to
Hindus and Muslims; the interaction term is small in magnitude and never approaches
statistical significance, providing suggestive evidence that branch switching is unlikely to
be a major concern for our analysis.
III.E Heterogeneity by age of exposure
To this point, we have not taken a position on how in-group favoritism might vary
with age of exposure to Hindu-Muslim frictions. Extant evidence from developmental
psychology suggests that out-group prejudice develops by the age of 10 and that, more
important from our perspective, environmental influence on prejudice is strongest prior
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to age 10 (see Raabe and Beelmann (2011) for a meta-analysis).9
We group loan officers based on their age of first exposure to riot fatalities: those
first exposed before the age of 10; those first exposed during adolescence (11-18); and
those first exposed during adulthood (but not yet employed by the bank). In Table 13,
we interact the riot exposure dummy variable with indicator variables for first exposure
before age 10 and first exposure at 11-18; the direct effect of riot exposure thus reflects the
effect of first experiencing riots during adulthood. Across all specifications, we observe a
near-zero effect of riot exposure first experienced during adulthood (though the standard
errors are such that we cannot rule out potentially sizeable effects). We find a much bigger
impact of riot exposure among loan officers first experienced during early childhood. For
example, in the first two columns, the effect size for officers who experienced riots during
early childhood is nearly twice that of loan officers who first experienced riots during
adolescence.
Given our priors based on the child development literature, we view the findings in
this section as providing a further validation of our interpretation of our main results as
reflecting a causal link from riot exposure to in-group favoritism. We also see this finding
as making a contribution to this literature, as we know of no prior work which links age
of exposure to inter-group frictions and later life prejudice, particularly based on real
stakes outcomes.
III.F The impact of bank managers’ exposure to the 2002 Gu-
jarat riots
Our analysis thus far has focused on the effect of riot exposure in bank officers’ early
years on lending decisions that take place potentially decades later. In this section, we
examine the effect of exposure that is concurrent with tenure at the bank. This distinct
9While researchers have found that survey-based measures of prejudice decline during adolescence,
there is no such decline in measures of implicit bias, leading researchers to conclude that survey responses
of older children may suffer from social desirability bias.
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analysis serves several purposes. First, it provides a clearer parallel to earlier work,
such as Hjort (2014) and Shayo and Zussman (2017), which looks at relatively short-run
responses to ethnic strife, and allows us to provide a quantitative comparison between
the impact of recent versus early life riot exposure. Second, as we elaborate below, our
analysis below based on the 2002 Gujarat riots allows for a sharper identification of the
effects of riot exposure, and thus provides some validation for our broader set of empirical
estimates.
Since we have data for the years 1999-2006, the riot occurs in the middle of our
sample and we can study how managers’ decisions change as a result of exposure to this
riot.
The Gujarat riots were triggered by the burning of a train carrying Hindu pilgrims
near the city of Godhra on February 27, 2002. The cause of the fire, which resulted in
58 deaths, remains the source of controversy. But it was blamed on the local Muslim
community, and in the days that followed anti-Muslim riots broke out across the state.
Reports put the death toll at around 2,000, making it one of the worst episodes of
communal violence since Indian independence in 1947 (see Field et al. (2008) and Mitra
and Ray (2014)). It is also important to note that the riots were contained within the
state of Gujarat, and did not spread to other parts of the country.
Our empirical strategy is as follows. We consider the 28 branch managers stationed
in Gujarat when the riots took place. We look at the bank branches where these Gujarat-
exposed managers are subsequently rotated, and examine whether lending patterns shift
upon their arrival. (We do not include branches in Gujarat, since the riots were a sizeable
shock to the expected creditworthiness of Muslims in the state, given the loss of property
and life. Since the timing of rotation is staggered across branches, all branches in this
restricted sample experience turnover from a manager who was not exposed to the Gujarat
riots to a Gujarat-exposed manager, but at different points in time, allowing us to identify
a “Gujarat exposure” effect.
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In Table 14 we report the results from the following specification:
ReligSharebq = βGujaratRiotExperiencem(bq) + Controlsbq + αb + γd(b),q + εbq(4)
where ReligSharebq is the fraction of new lending obtained by a religion (Muslim, Hindu,
or Others) at branch b in quarter q; GujaratRiotExperiencem(bq) denotes whether
branch manager m stationed at branch b in quarter q was present in Gujarat during
the 2002 riots; γd(b),q is a set of quarter and branch fixed effects in Panel A and a set of
state × quarter and branch fixed effects in Panel B.
The results in Panel A, indicate that when a Gujarat-experienced manager joins
a branch, the Hindus’ share of lending increases by 9.6 percentage points, while the
Muslim share declines by 8.1 percentage points; there is no significant change in the
share of lending to other religions. We obtain qualitatively similar results when we use
the fraction of loan contracts as the outcome variable, or add quarter-state fixed effects
(Panel B). The results suggest an impact from contemporaneous exposure to religious
frictions that is of roughly the same scale as the effects we report in our main analysis
(though the violence and upheaval associated with the 2002 riots were of a different scale
from those taking place during 1950-95).
In our final set of results we explore whether, given the scale of the 2002 riots,
managers elsewhere in India were also affected. In doing so, we also explore the joint
hypothesis that the channel of influence is via the media. To do so, we look at lending by
loan officers who were not present in Gujarat during the riots, in branches located outside
of the state of Gujarat, to minimize any direct influence of riot exposure on in-group bias.
We use two measures of media exposure: TV viewership and newspaper circulation
per capita, both at the state-level. Since we may disaggregate TV viewership by commu-
nity type (rural, semiurban, urban, metropolitan) in our analysis based on TV exposure,
we may include (as in Table 14) branch fixed effects, district × time fixed effects, and
home district × time fixed effects as controls. Since newspaper circulation is at the state
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level, we cannot include district × time fixed effects in our analysis of the role of newspa-
per penetration. Finally, we define Post as quarters that occur after the 2002 riots took
place.
The results, which we present in Table 15 and Table 16 for television viewership and
newspaper circulation respectively, suggest that loan officers in areas with greater media
exposure respond with a greater increase in in-group bias following the 2002 riots. In
particular, the coefficient on the interaction of TV viewership and Post is negative for
Muslim lending, and positive (and of comparable magnitude) for Hindu lending. While
these results are more fragile than our main findings — the coefficients are not consistently
significant across specifications — they provide suggestive evidence that media exposure
may exacerbate bias as a result of inter-group frictions. The results in Table 16 are even
more fragile, but directionally consistent with an increased in-group bias as a result of
media exposure to the 2002 riots.
IV Conclusion
In this paper, we provide evidence which indicates that personal exposure to ethnic
frictions can have long-lasted consequences for inter-group animosity. Our findings can
help to better make sense both how ethnic frictions can be self-reinforcing: as each
subsequent generation is exposed to ethnic friction, he or she may adopt stronger in-group
preferences that, in turn, perpetuates existing cleavages within a society. Our results
further indicate that these ethnic frictions have allocative consequences (in our case via
credit), which adds to efforts to provide some micro-foundation for the macro association
between ethnic divisions and economic growth. Since we study lending decisions in a
state bank, where loan officers have relatively weak pay incentives, it is natural to ask
the extent to which the discrimination we observe is lower in private banks where officers
face higher-powered performance incentives.
Our findings also emphasize the relative rapidity with which group-based animus can
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shift as a result of salient events. On the one hand, this can lead to rapid aggravation of
inter-group frictions (perhaps highlighting the value of efforts to mitigate such cleavages
from occurring in the first place). Yet our findings have a more hopeful message when
combined with those of Blouin and Mukand (2018), which studies reconciliation as a
result of government messaging in Rwanda. Their work finds that government efforts
at healing inter-group animosity led to an improvement inside of a generation, even in
the wake of ethnic cleansing of tragic proportions. Thus, inter-group frictions appear
malleable in both directions – they can worsen as a result of clashes, or improve via
deliberate efforts.
As more work emerges on individual responses to shocks to community relations –
both positive and negative – we can hope to gain a fuller sense of the consequences of
ethnic frictions, and the potential of such frictions to worsen or lessen over time.
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Figure 1: Distribution of Riot Death Exposure
This figure provides a kernel density plot for the number of deaths in Hindu-Muslim riots
experienced by branch managers while resident in their hometowns, conditional on experiencing
at least one death
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Figure 2: Share Of Lending to Muslims versus Hindu Borrowers Around
Officer Transitions
The top figure shows the coefficients from a regression to capture shifts in the share of lending
received by Muslims and Hindus around transitions to riot-exposed branch managers. The
“whiskers” show 95 percent confidence intervals. The bottom figure provides a similar “event
plot” using the share of loan contracts as the outcome variable.
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Figure 3: Riot Exposure and the Share Of Lending to Muslims Borrowers
Across Branch Manager Tenure at the Bank
This figure provides regression coefficients from a specification that allows the impact of riot
exposure on Muslim share of lending to vary as a function of the branch manager’s years of
employment at the bank. The “whiskers” show 95 percent confidence intervals.
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Table 1: Summary Statistics of Riots in India
The following table reports the summary statistics of the number of deaths, injuries and arrests
in India due to Hindu-Muslim riots during 1950-1995.
STATE Total Killed Total Injured Total Arrest Total No. of Riots
Andhra Pradesh 339 1290 5936 51
Assam 478 224 228 22
Bihar 1005 805 2778 78
Delhi 91 739 1842 33
Gujarat 1657 4487 11542 244
Haryana 5 8 83 4
Karnataka 174 1082 1958 74
Kerala 16 290 111 20
Maharashtra 1450 5594 18432 201
Madhya Pradesh 339 1726 10050 68
Orissa 81 105 111 17
Punjab 0 4 12 2
Rajasthan 81 379 98 26
Tamil Nadu 32 209 277 16
Uttar Pradesh 1244 3158 35857 201
West Bengal 224 853 3916 70
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Table 2: Religion of Borrowers and Lenders
The following table reports the percentages of borrowers and lenders belonging to each religion.
Note that in our analysis, we focus on Hindu branch managers owing to the very small fraction
of Muslim (and other) loan officers.









Table 3: Summary Statistics on Branch-Group-Quarter Data
The following table reports the summary statistics of the primary variables employed in our analysis. We provide summary statistics separately
for loan officers who experience at least 1 riot-related death in their hometown and loan officers who did not experience a fatal riot in their
hometown. The data is at the branch-group-quarter level.
Riot Exposed (N= 256) Not Riot Exposed (N=1523)
Mean Std Dev p1 p50 p99 Mean Std Dev p1 p50 p99
No. of Killing Experienced 63.53 161.71 1.00 12.00 608.00 – – – – –
No. of Branches Worked 2.01 0.95 1.00 2.00 4.00 1.91 0.95 1.00 2.00 5.00
Age 47.59 4.31 33.00 48.00 55.00 46.70 4.43 34.00 47.00 55.00
Total Experience in Bank (Years) 24.23 5.53 8.00 25.00 35.00 21.66 4.65 10.00 24.00 33.00
Sum of New Credit (INR Mn) 1.07 4.89 0.00 0.12 10.00 1.04 2.87 0.00 0.12 10.30
Sum of New Credit to New Borrowers (INR Mn) 0.89 0.47 0.00 0.08 8.55 0.86 0.25 0.00 0.08 8.69
Sum of New Credit to Repeat Borrowers (INR Mn) 0.18 0.81 0.00 0.00 2.64 0.18 0.86 0.00 0.00 2.53
No. of New Loans 16.83 41.14 0.00 3.00 116.00 18.06 35.49 0.00 3.00 149.00
No. of New Loans to New Borrowers 14.10 36.44 0.00 2.00 101.00 15.24 30.85 0.00 2.00 124.00
Default 0.02 0.09 0.00 0.00 0.5 0.02 0.09 0.00 0.00 0.43
31
Table 4: Impact of Riot Experience on Lending Decisions
In this table we present the impact of riot experience on lending to borrowers belonging to different religions. Riot Experience = 1 for any
loan officer who experienced 10 or more riot-related deaths while living in his hometown. We include branch, district × quarter, and home
district × quarter fixed effects. In columns 1, 2 and 3 the dependent variable is the share of debt. In columns 4, 5 and 6 the dependent
variable is the share of the number of loans. Standard errors are clustered at the branch manager level. ***, **, * denote statistical





Muslim Borrowers Hindu Borrowers Other Borrowers Muslim Borrowers Hindu Borrowers Other Borrowers
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Riot Experience Dummy -0.043∗∗∗ 0.040∗∗∗ -0.012 -0.030∗∗∗ 0.028∗∗ -0.007
(0.013) (0.014) (0.013) (0.010) (0.012) (0.012)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Branch Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
District × Time Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Home District × Time Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.729 0.746 0.777 0.811 0.796 0.793
Obs. 11799 12594 9095 11799 12594 9095
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Table 5: Impact of Riot Experience on Amount of Lending
In this table we show the impact of riot experience on the quantity of lending to different religions. Riot Experience = 1 for any loan officer
who experienced 10 or more riot-related deaths while living in his hometown. We include branch, district × quarter fixed effects and home
district × quarter fixed effects. In columns 1, 2 and 3 the dependent variable is log(1 + TotalLending) for each religion. In columns 4, 5 and
6 the dependent variable is log(1 + NumberofLoanContracts) for each religion. Standard errors are clustered at the branch manager level.
***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels.
Log(1 + Total Lending) Log(1 + Number of Loan Contracts)
Muslim Borrowers Hindu Borrowers Other Borrowers Muslim Borrowers Hindu Borrowers Other Borrowers
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Riot Experience Dummy -1.474∗ 0.187∗ 0.850 -0.238∗∗ -0.073 0.069
(0.789) (0.102) (1.253) (0.103) (0.077) (0.122)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Branch Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
District × Time Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Home District × Time Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.681 0.784 0.690 0.785 0.804 0.801
Obs. 11799 12594 9095 11799 12594 9095
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Table 6: Placebo - Caste-based differences in lending
In this table we present the impact of riot experience on lending to Hindu borrowers based
on whether they are of the same caste as the branch manager. Data are at the branch-
quarter-caste level. Riot Experience = 1 for any loan officer who experienced 10 or more
riot-related deaths while living in his hometown. Same Caste = 1 for the borrower group
that is of the same caste as the branch manager in that quarter. We include branch × caste
, district × caste × quarter, branch × quarter fixed effects and home district × quarter fixed
effects. In columns 1 and 2 the dependent variable is the share of debt. In columns 3 and 4
the dependent variable is the share of the number of loans. Standard errors are clustered at





(1) (2) (3) (4)
Same Caste Dummy × Riot 0.009 0.009 0.012 0.012
(0.020) (0.019) (0.021) (0.020)
Same Caste Dummy 0.026∗∗∗ 0.026∗∗∗ 0.019∗∗ 0.019∗∗
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
Riot Dummy -0.002 -0.003
(0.005) (0.005)
Controls Yes No Yes No
Branch × Caste Yes Yes Yes Yes
District × Caste × Time Yes Yes Yes Yes
Branch × Time FE No Yes No Yes
Home District × Time Yes No Yes No
R2 0.858 0.858 0.860 0.860
Obs. 58660 58660 58660 58660
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Table 7: Impact of Riot Experience on Loan Performance
In this table we investigate how riot exposure impacts loan performance. Riot Experience
= 1 for any loan officer who experienced 10 or more riot-related deaths while living in his
hometown. Our analysis compares the default rates of loans disbursed to Muslim versus non-
Muslim borrowers by riot-exposed managers versus those with no riot exposure. In columns 1
and 2 we include branch × borrower religion fixed effects, district × borrower religion × quarter
fixed effects and lender home district × quarter fixed effects. In columns 3 and 4, we include
branch × quarter fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the branch manager level. ***,
**, * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels.
Default Default Default Default
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Riot -0.035∗ -0.035∗
(0.018) (0.018)
Non-Muslim Borrowers × Riot 0.025∗∗ 0.018∗
(0.012) (0.011)
Hindu Borrowers × Riot 0.025∗∗ 0.019∗
(0.012) (0.011)
Other Borrowers × Riot 0.024 0.008
(0.020) (0.016)
Controls Yes Yes No No
Branch × Religion Yes Yes Yes Yes
District × Religion × Time Yes Yes Yes Yes
Branch × Time FE No No Yes Yes
Home District × Time Yes Yes No No
R2 0.608 0.608 0.770 0.770
Obs. 24531 24531 19500 19500
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Table 8: Impact of Riot Experience on Lending Decisions Across Bank Experience
In this table we investigate whether the impact of riot experience varies based on a branch manager’s tenure with the bank. Riot Experience
= 1 for any loan officer who experienced 10 or more deaths while living in his hometown. We include branch, district × quarter, and
home district × quarter fixed effects. In columns 1, 2 and 3 the dependent variable is the share of new debt. In columns 4, 5 and 6 the
dependent variable is the share of new loan contracts. Standard errors are clustered at the branch manager level. ***, **, * denote statistical





Muslim Borrowers Hindu Borrowers Other Borrowers Muslim Borrowers Hindu Borrowers Other Borrowers
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
High Bank Experience × Riot Experience Dummy -0.048∗∗∗ 0.044∗∗∗ -0.013 -0.031∗∗∗ 0.028∗∗ -0.008
(0.014) (0.015) (0.014) (0.010) (0.012) (0.013)
Low Bank Experience × Riot Experience Dummy -0.029∗ 0.028∗ -0.007 -0.028∗∗ 0.029∗∗ -0.002
(0.015) (0.017) (0.018) (0.012) (0.013) (0.015)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Branch Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
District × Time Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Home District × Time Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.729 0.746 0.777 0.811 0.796 0.793
Obs. 11799 12594 9095 11799 12594 9095
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Table 9: Impact of Riot Experience on Lending Decisions to New Borrowers
Riot Experience = 1 for any loan officer who experienced 10 or more riot-related deaths while living in his hometown. We include branch,
district × quarter, and home district × quarter fixed effects. In columns 1, 2 and 3 the dependent variable is the share of new debt to
first-time borrowers. In columns 4, 5 and 6 the dependent variable is the share of new loan contracts to first-time borrowers. Standard errors





Muslim Borrowers Hindu Borrowers Other Borrowers Muslim Borrowers Hindu Borrowers Other Borrowers
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Riot Experience Dummy -0.045∗∗∗ 0.043∗∗ -0.017 -0.030∗∗ 0.030∗∗ -0.015
(0.016) (0.018) (0.016) (0.012) (0.014) (0.015)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Branch Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
District × Time Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Home District × Time Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.708 0.715 0.739 0.788 0.763 0.749
Obs. 11761 12550 9054 11761 12550 9054
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Table 10: Impact of Riot Experience on Lending Decisions to Repeat Borrowers
Riot Experience = 1 for any loan officer who experienced 10 or more riot-related deaths while living in his hometown. We include branch,
district × quarter, and home district × quarter fixed effects. In columns 1, 2 and 3 the dependent variable is the share of new debt to
repeat borrowers. In columns 4, 5 and 6 the dependent variable is the share of new loan contracts to repeat borrowers. Standard errors are





Muslim Borrowers Hindu Borrowers Other Borrowers Muslim Borrowers Hindu Borrowers Other Borrowers
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Riot Experience Dummy -0.045∗ 0.019 0.027 -0.054∗∗ 0.036 0.012
(0.024) (0.024) (0.023) (0.022) (0.024) (0.021)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Branch Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
District × Time Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Home District × Time Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.591 0.662 0.743 0.615 0.682 0.768
Obs. 8953 9613 7050 8980 9646 7068
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Table 11: Impact of Riot Experience on Lending Decisions: Rural versus Urban Areas
Riot Experience = 1 for any loan officer who experienced 10 or more riot-related deaths while living in his hometown. Urban is a dummy
variable denoting that the branch is located in a semiurban, urban, or metropolitan area. We include branch, district × quarter, and
home district × quarter fixed effects. In columns 1, 2 and 3 the dependent variable is the share of new debt. In columns 4, 5 and 6 the
dependent variable is the share of new loan contracts. Standard errors are clustered at the branch manager level. ***, **, * denote statistical





Muslim Borrowers Hindu Borrowers Other Borrowers Muslim Borrowers Hindu Borrowers Other Borrowers
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Urban × Riot Experience Dummy -0.003 0.003 0.010 -0.002 -0.002 0.021∗
(0.016) (0.016) (0.014) (0.013) (0.013) (0.011)
Riot Experience Dummy -0.042∗∗∗ 0.039∗∗∗ -0.016 -0.030∗∗∗ 0.029∗∗ -0.016
(0.013) (0.015) (0.014) (0.011) (0.012) (0.014)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Branch Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
District × Time Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Home District × Time Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.729 0.746 0.777 0.811 0.796 0.793
Obs. 11784 12577 9081 11784 12577 9081
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Table 12: Impact of Riot Experience on Lending in Monopoly versus Competitive Branches
Riot Experience = 1 for any loan officer who experienced 10 or more riot-related deaths while living in his hometown. We define a branch
as a Monopoly if there are no other branches (from the same bank or other banks) within a 10 kilometer radius. We include branch, district
× quarter fixed effects and home district × quarter fixed effects. In columns 1, 2 and 3 the dependent variable is the share of new debt. In
columns 4, 5 and 6 the dependent variable is the share of new loan contracts. Standard errors are clustered at the branch manager level.





Muslim Borrowers Hindu Borrowers Other Borrowers Muslim Borrowers Hindu Borrowers Other Borrowers
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Monopoly × Riot Experience Dummy 0.010 -0.009 -0.001 0.008 -0.002 -0.018
(0.015) (0.016) (0.015) (0.012) (0.013) (0.012)
Riot Experience Dummy -0.048∗∗∗ 0.045∗∗∗ -0.012 -0.035∗∗∗ 0.029∗∗ 0.001
(0.016) (0.016) (0.015) (0.013) (0.013) (0.012)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Branch Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
District × Time Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Home District × Time Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.729 0.746 0.777 0.811 0.796 0.793
Obs. 11784 12577 9081 11784 12577 9081
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Table 13: Impact of Age of First Riot Experience on Lending Decisions
Riot Experience = 1 for any loan officer who experienced 10 or more riot-related deaths while living in his hometown. We group managers
with riot exposure into three categories: (1) Managers who experienced their first riot at age ≤ 10; (2) Managers who experienced their first
riot between the ages of 11 and 18; (3) Managers who experienced their first riot after the age of 18. We include branch, district × quarter,
and home district × quarter fixed effects. In columns 1, 2 and 3 the dependent variable is the share of new debt. In columns 4, 5 and 6
the dependent variable is the share of new loan contracts. Standard errors are clustered at the branch manager level. ***, **, * denote





Muslim Borrowers Hindu Borrowers Other Borrowers Muslim Borrowers Hindu Borrowers Other Borrowers
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Riot Experience Dummy × First Riot Experience (< 10 Years) -0.091∗∗∗ 0.083∗∗ -0.020 -0.075∗∗∗ 0.053∗∗ 0.028
(0.031) (0.039) (0.034) (0.025) (0.024) (0.036)
Riot Experience Dummy × First Riot Experience (10− 18 Years) -0.059∗∗ 0.055 -0.014 -0.043∗ 0.023 0.032
(0.029) (0.037) (0.034) (0.023) (0.024) (0.035)
riot 0.015 -0.014 0.002 0.013 0.003 -0.038
(0.026) (0.036) (0.035) (0.022) (0.022) (0.036)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Branch Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
District × Time Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Home District × Time Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.729 0.746 0.777 0.812 0.796 0.794
Obs. 11799 12594 9095 11799 12594 9095
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Table 14: Impact of Gujarat Riot Experience on Lending Decisions
This table examines how the 2002 Gujarat riots affected lending decisions. We restrict our sample to branches outside of Gujarat where





Muslim Borrowers Hindu Borrowers Other Borrowers Muslim Borrowers Hindu Borrowers Other Borrowers
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A
Gujarat Riot Experience Dummy -0.081∗∗∗ 0.096∗∗∗ -0.021 -0.038∗∗ 0.052∗∗∗ -0.018∗
(0.026) (0.029) (0.015) (0.016) (0.016) (0.010)
Branch Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.755 0.689 0.390 0.827 0.754 0.469
Obs. 324 331 227 324 331 227
Panel B
Gujarat Riot Experience Dummy -0.089∗∗ 0.079∗ 0.002 -0.051∗∗ 0.056∗∗ -0.012
(0.034) (0.040) (0.014) (0.021) (0.021) (0.010)
Branch Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State × Time Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.869 0.804 0.497 0.908 0.861 0.515
Obs. 229 236 143 229 236 143
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Table 15: TV Viewership and the 2002 Gujarat Riots
This table examines how TV viewership affected managers’ lending decisions following the 2002 Gujarat riots. See the text for details of the
sample and variable construction, and for information on the estimation. Standard errors are clustered at the branch manager level. ***, **,





Muslim Borrowers Hindu Borrowers Other Borrowers Muslim Borrowers Hindu Borrowers Other Borrowers
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Share of TV Viewers × Post -0.060∗∗ 0.063∗∗∗ -0.005 -0.036∗ 0.034∗ 0.001
(0.023) (0.024) (0.018) (0.020) (0.020) (0.013)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Branch Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
District × Time Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Home District × Time Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.777 0.787 0.794 0.848 0.837 0.820
Obs. 11552 12075 9360 11552 12075 9360
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Table 16: Newspaper Circulation and the 2002 Gujarat Riot
This table examines how newspaper circulation affected managers’ lending decisions following the 2002 Gujarat riots. See the text for details
of the sample and variable construction, and for information on the estimation. Standard errors are clustered at the branch manager level.





Muslim Borrowers Hindu Borrowers Other Borrowers Muslim Borrowers Hindu Borrowers Other Borrowers
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Newspaper Circulation × Post -0.086 0.064∗ -0.012 -0.064 0.035 -0.006
(0.059) (0.038) (0.031) (0.063) (0.033) (0.021)
Newspaper Circulation 0.084 -0.037 -0.028 0.050 -0.037 0.010
(0.068) (0.065) (0.056) (0.064) (0.053) (0.047)
Branch Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Home District × Time Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.689 0.714 0.745 0.789 0.785 0.796




Table A.1: Impact of Riot Experience on Lending Decisions (Deaths Experienced >=5)
In this table we present the impact of riot experience on lending to borrowers belonging to different religions. Riot Experience = 1 for any
loan officer who experienced 5 or more riot-related deaths while living in his hometown. We include branch, district × quarter, and home
district × quarter fixed effects. In columns 1, 2 and 3 the dependent variable is the share of debt. In columns 4, 5 and 6 the dependent
variable is the share of the number of loans. Standard errors are clustered at the branch manager level. ***, **, * denote statistical





Muslim Borrowers Hindu Borrowers Other Borrowers Muslim Borrowers Hindu Borrowers Other Borrowers
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Riot Experience Dummy -0.038∗∗∗ 0.037∗∗∗ -0.015 -0.023∗∗ 0.022∗ -0.010
(0.012) (0.013) (0.012) (0.010) (0.011) (0.011)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Branch Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
District × Time Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Home District × Time Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.729 0.746 0.777 0.811 0.796 0.793
Obs. 11799 12594 9095 11799 12594 9095
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Table A.2: Impact of Riot Experience on Lending Decisions (Deaths Experienced >0)
In this table we present the impact of riot experience on lending to borrowers belonging to different religions. Riot Experience = 1 for any
loan officer who experienced at least one riot-related death while living in his hometown. We include branch, district × quarter, and home
district × quarter fixed effects. In columns 1, 2 and 3 the dependent variable is the share of debt. In columns 4, 5 and 6 the dependent
variable is the share of the number of loans. Standard errors are clustered at the branch manager level. ***, **, * denote statistical





Muslim Borrowers Hindu Borrowers Other Borrowers Muslim Borrowers Hindu Borrowers Other Borrowers
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Riot Experience Dummy -0.022∗∗ 0.013 0.001 -0.015∗ 0.008 -0.001
(0.010) (0.011) (0.010) (0.008) (0.010) (0.009)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Branch Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
District × Time Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Home District × Time Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.729 0.746 0.777 0.811 0.796 0.793
Obs. 11799 12594 9095 11799 12594 9095
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Table A.3: Impact of Riot Experience on Lending Decisions — Log(1+Deaths Experienced)
In this table we present the impact of riot experience on lending to borrowers belonging to different religions, using a continuous measure of
riot exposure based on the number of riot-related deaths experienced by a branch manager while living in his hometown. We include branch,
district × quarter, and home district × quarter fixed effects. In columns 1, 2 and 3 the dependent variable is the share of debt. In columns





Muslim Borrowers Hindu Borrowers Other Borrowers Muslim Borrowers Hindu Borrowers Other Borrowers
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Log (1+Death) -0.008∗∗ 0.007∗∗ -0.003 -0.005∗∗ 0.004∗ -0.001
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Branch Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
District × Time Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Home District × Time Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.729 0.746 0.777 0.811 0.796 0.793
Obs. 11799 12594 9095 11799 12594 9095
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Table A.4: Impact of Experiencing the 1969 Gujarat Riots on Lending Decisions
In this table we present the impact of riot experience on lending to borrowers belonging to different religions. Riot Experience = 1 for any
loan officer who was in his hometown during the 1969 riots, and whose hometown had at least one fatality during the riots. We include
branch, district × quarter, and home district × quarter fixed effects. In columns 1, 2 and 3 the dependent variable is the share of debt. In
columns 4, 5 and 6 the dependent variable is the share of the number of loans. Standard errors are clustered at the branch manager level.





Muslim Borrowers Hindu Borrowers Other Borrowers Muslim Borrowers Hindu Borrowers Other Borrowers
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Experienced Riot of 1969 -0.042∗∗∗ 0.038∗∗∗ -0.009 -0.027∗∗ 0.023∗ -0.006
(0.013) (0.014) (0.013) (0.011) (0.012) (0.013)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Branch Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
District × Time Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Home District × Time Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.735 0.753 0.780 0.813 0.796 0.793
Obs. 10530 11212 8155 10530 11212 8155
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Table A.5: Impact of Riot Experience on Lending Decisions, Controlling for Hometown Population
In this table we present the impact of riot experience on lending to borrowers belonging to different religions, controlling for hometown
population. Riot Experience = 1 for any loan officer who experienced 10 or more riot-related deaths while living in his hometown. We
include branch, district × quarter, and home district × quarter fixed effects. In columns 1, 2 and 3 the dependent variable is the share of
debt. In columns 4, 5 and 6 the dependent variable is the share of the number of loans. Standard errors are clustered at the branch manager





Muslim Borrowers Hindu Borrowers Other Borrowers Muslim Borrowers Hindu Borrowers Other Borrowers
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Riot Experience Dummy -0.040∗∗∗ 0.045∗∗∗ -0.025 -0.023∗ 0.025∗ -0.011
(0.015) (0.017) (0.016) (0.012) (0.014) (0.015)
Log(Population) -0.001 -0.001 0.002 -0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Branch Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
District × Time Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Home District × Time Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.729 0.746 0.777 0.811 0.796 0.793
Obs. 11799 12594 9095 11799 12594 9095
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Table A.6: Impact of Riot Experience on Lending Decisions Across Branch Experience
In this table we present the impact of riot experience on lending to borrowers belonging to different religions, controlling for hometown
population, allowing the effect to differ based on whether the branch manager has above or below median tenure at the bank. Riot
Experience = 1 for any loan officer who experienced 10 or more riot-related deaths while living in his hometown. We include branch, district
× quarter, and home district × quarter fixed effects. In columns 1, 2 and 3 the dependent variable is the share of debt. In columns 4, 5 and
6 the dependent variable is the share of the number of loans. Standard errors are clustered at the branch manager level. ***, **, * denote





Muslim Borrowers Hindu Borrowers Other Borrowers Muslim Borrowers Hindu Borrowers Other Borrowers
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
High Branch Experience × Riot Experience Dummy -0.045∗∗∗ 0.041∗∗∗ -0.010 -0.034∗∗∗ 0.033∗∗∗ -0.007
(0.013) (0.015) (0.014) (0.011) (0.013) (0.012)
Low Branch Experience × Riot Experience Dummy -0.041∗∗∗ 0.039∗∗∗ -0.013 -0.028∗∗∗ 0.025∗∗ -0.007
(0.013) (0.015) (0.013) (0.011) (0.012) (0.013)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Branch Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
District × Time Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Home District × Time Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.729 0.746 0.777 0.811 0.796 0.793
Obs. 11799 12594 9095 11799 12594 9095
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